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Introduction 
This article addresses the Bush Administration’s policy approach to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) proliferation. While the article will largely focus on the current Administration’s 
policy approach to the WMD threat in terms of what is new or different from what went before, this 
Administration clearly built on a strong counterproliferation foundation. Dr. Ted Warner, former 
Assistant Secretary of Defense, carried the concept forward in the seminal Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative that Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced in December 
1993.[1][2] 
Globalization and Proliferation Networks 
The term “proliferation networks” has come into widespread use since the revelation of the A.Q. 
Khan nuclear supply network. The term appears in neither the Bush Administration’s first National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America nor its National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, both of which were issued in 2002. Yet networks have long been central to 
WMD proliferation. The first atomic bombs were made possible by a series of scientific 
breakthroughs, each new one building upon its predecessors. There was open collaboration in 
the decades preceding World War II among an international network of scientists, primarily 
physicists, who were intent on advancing science’s frontiers. When the U.S. government fully 
grasped the war-making potential of these scientific advances, it moved to shut down this network 
by classifying all information relating to the Manhattan Project.  
This security action had only limited effect. The Soviet Union utilized its international espionage 
network to acquire American and others’ nuclear secrets and apply them to its own weapons 
program.[3] All other current or emerging nuclear weapons powers have tapped external sources 
for technology and materials for their weapons programs. They have done so legitimately under 
the auspices of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, illicitly through espionage, by direct and witting 
assistance of other states, or through black or grey market business networks flying below the 
radar of multilateral export control regimes. States and terrorists also have utilized external supply 
networks to acquire agents, materials, and technology to produce chemical and biological 
weapons. As with the U.S. efforts during World War II to deny access to Manhattan Project 
information, our subsequent efforts to prevent WMD proliferation have achieved only limited 
success. 
Globalization is not the reason for WMD proliferation and its associated networks, but it has 
altered their character. WMD proliferation networks have become more globalized over time as a 
broader scope of state and non-state actors have undertaken to acquire WMD and as the 
sources of WMD materials and technology have become more diverse and accessible. At the 
start of the post-Cold War era, policymakers worried primarily about the proliferation of WMD 
moving from the states of the former Soviet Union to rogue states. As the 1990s progressed, they 
increasingly recognized and fretted about “secondary WMD proliferation” occurring among 
increasingly WMD-capable rogue states. After the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in Tokyo, and 
to a much greater extent after 9/11 and the Fall 2001 anthrax letter attacks, the United States has 
become obsessed with terrorists’ explicit pursuit of and ability to acquire or develop WMD—
including through that pervasive medium of modern globalization, the Internet.  
Most recently, the A.Q. Khan network demonstrated that a non-state actor could act like a multi-
national “prime contractor” in providing rogue states and possibly others with the expertise and 
materials to produce nuclear weapons through non-state sources as diverse as Malaysia, Turkey, 
South Africa, Dubai, and Western Europe. The Administration indicates that Khan’s network has 
been shut down, but we must at least assume that elements of it could be reassembled or that 
similar networks exist or could come into being. The rising prominence of non-state actors—
terrorists and profit-minded suppliers exploiting the opportunities created by globalization—
represents the most salient and disturbing new development in our evolving understanding of 
WMD proliferation networks. The real challenge of globalization with regard to WMD proliferation, 
I believe, is to recognize, adapt, and apply our methods of prevention to the new actors and 
means of proliferation that globalization entails. 
Bush Administration Policy 
The Bush Administration certainly assumed office in 2001 with the view that the country 
confronted a changed and more dangerous WMD threat than had the previous Administration in 
its early years. The new Administration would recognize at the core of that increased threat a 
nexus of technology and radicalism.[4] Globalization is a central feature in this nexus. It expands 
access to the technologies of mass destruction and is coupled with the active pursuit of WMD by 
actors hostile to the liberalizing forces of globalization and the influence of its principal purveyor, 
the United States. Of course, the Administration had al Qaeda, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran 
foremost in its mind in this regard.[5]  
The President set the bar high in identifying the Administration’s goals in combating the WMD 
threat. Whereas the Clinton Administration had promulgated a presidential WMD policy focused 
on nonproliferation,[6] the Bush Administration redirected the United States toward a policy 
focused on counterproliferation. He asserted in his National Security Strategy that “Our enemies 
have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates 
that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to 
succeed.”[7] He underscored this determination in his National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction by stating, “ We will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes and 
terrorists to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”[8]  
The Administration accorded increased emphasis on counterproliferation to achieve its ambitious 
goals.[9] Despite the previous Administration’s Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, the 
incoming Administration felt that the United States writ large had remained overly reliant during 
the 1990s upon traditional nonproliferation approaches. Arms control treaties, multilateral 
nonproliferation regimes, and other diplomatic efforts, though necessary, had not proven 
sufficient to prevent determined adversaries from acquiring WMD. By the end of 2001, preventing, 
and preparing for, the potential use of proliferated WMD had become a national priority at least as 
important as preventing further proliferation. Counterproliferation was but one—and not 
necessarily a leading one—of the numerous objectives in the 1993 presidential policy guidance 
on WMD threats. In contrast, counterproliferation is first of the three pillars of President Bush’s 
2002 National Strategy to Combat WMD, alongside nonproliferation and consequence 
management.[10] 
The Administration also resolved to use more active and robust means to combat both the use 
and proliferation of WMD. This was immediately evident in the Administration’s determination to 
expedite a strategic missile defense system for the United States and not to allow the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to stand in the way. It became more pronounced with the 
Administration’s assertion of its right and intent to act preemptively, if necessary, to forestall or 
prevent hostile acts by WMD-armed adversaries, albeit not necessarily by military means.[11] 
The decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and, especially, the professed willingness to act 
preemptively proved controversial, particularly abroad. Many allies and friends, as well as foes, 
viewed these developments as evidence of a dangerously assertive unilateralism by a state of 
unprecedented and unrivaled power. This was particularly so when viewed in conjunction with 
other controversial moves like withdrawing U.S. support from the Kyoto Convention on global 
warming and actively opposing the International Criminal Court.  
Proactive interdiction is another central element of the Administration’s more vigorous approach 
to combating WMD. In contrast to missile defense and preemption, proactive interdiction has 
been embraced by a large part of the international community—for reasons to be discussed later. 
The Administration’s strategy describes proactive interdiction, working both internally and with 
friends and allies, to enhance the capabilities of the military, intelligence, technical, and law 
enforcement communities to prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise 
to hostile states and terrorist organizations.[12] Shortly after the classified version of that strategy 
was issued, another directive followed establishing a new interagency organizational structure for 
interdiction. While interdiction long has been part of the U.S. toolkit for countering proliferation, 
this Administration has accorded interdiction greater policy attention, coherence, and international 
prominence, primarily through the vehicle of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).[13] 
Efforts to strengthen interdiction capabilities proceeded during the early years of the 
Administration, but were overshadowed by the prosecution of the war on terrorism, the creation of 
homeland security structures and capabilities, and the build up to and eventual invasion of Iraq. 
The President’s controversial invasion of Iraq became the ultimate expression of his 
determination to preempt developing WMD threats. The decision to invade was a high-stakes 
gamble. A decisive success might induce other rogue states to abandon their WMD programs—
lest they be next. Decisive success refers not only to disposing of the Saddam regime and its 
assessed WMD capacity, but also to readily establishing the basis for a stable, democratic, and 
prosperous Iraq. An indecisive result could mire the United States and its military in Iraq for many 
years and embolden other rogue states to advance their WMD programs. Although the final 
chapter of the U.S. invasion of Iraq has yet to be written, clearly we have not yet achieved a 
decisive success.  
The U.S. invasion of Iraq did, however, play an important role in inducing Libya to abandon its 
WMD programs. But those rogue states who waited longer to see how things would unfold in 
Iraq—including North Korea, Iran, and Syria—may now be even less inclined to relinquish their 
WMD capabilities than before the Iraq invasion. This is because they can recognize, like other 
observers, that the United States is in no position, militarily or politically, to initiate major offensive 
military action elsewhere as long as it is bogged down in Iraq. Without a credible threat of force—
even if implicit—to back negotiations for a rollback in WMD programs in North Korea and Iran, it 
is difficult to imagine those diplomatic efforts succeeding. This situation puts a premium on 
whatever other measures the United States and the international community can employ to stem 
the further proliferation of WMD capabilities to and from these and other adversaries. 
Today, proactive interdiction, and PSI in particular, is integral to the international community’s 
approach to accomplishing this goal. It remains a remarkable achievement that France, Germany, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and seven other countries were able to launch the PSI 
just two months after the Iraq invasion had begun—even amidst the intense and open acrimony 
between proponents and opponents of the military action against Iraq. This achievement testifies 
to the broad international consensus that had been established about the seriousness of the 
WMD threat and the need for serious, concerted responses—a consensus that resulted in large 
part from the labors of both the Clinton and Bush Administrations. It also reflects this 
Administration’s adoption of an approach toward international action on interdiction that contrasts 
with the perception, even among allies and friends, that the Administration has a predilection for 
unilateralism, the use of force, and insufficient regard for international law. The PSI Statement of 
Interdiction Principles makes clear that participating nations will act in accordance with both 
international law and their own national statutes. Additionally, each participant will decide on a 
case-by-case basis whether, and in what manner, they will contribute to PSI activities or 
operations.  
PSI represents another important feature of the Administration’s approach to combating the WMD 
threat, one that eschews the negotiation of complex, multilateral treaties or agreements for more 
expeditious and action-oriented solutions.[14] PSI was put together in a relatively short period 
and constitutes a set of activities rather than an organization. It has no underlying treaty or 
convention, only a concise statement of shared principles. It is not managed by a permanent 
secretariat, but rather by regular meetings of each participant’s representatives.[15] Moreover, 
within just three years, this initiative that began with 11 countries now counts the support of more 
than 70. It has conducted over 14 operational exercises involving air, ground, and land 
interdiction scenarios. It contributed to the interdiction of the ship BBC China that helped 
precipitate Libya’s decision to abandon its WMD programs. And in 2005 alone it contributed to 11 
other successful efforts.[16] In 2004, the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and 
Change encouraged all states to participate in PSI, and Kofi Annan applauded the efforts of PSI 
to “fill a gap in our defenses.”[17]  
PSI and proactive interdiction generally, however, are only part of the United States’ and the 
larger international community’s wider efforts to stem WMD proliferation. Many other elements—
like arms control treaties, nonproliferation regimes, and cooperative threat reduction assistance 
programs—long predate the George W. Bush Administration. All are supported by intelligence. 
The revelations about the A.Q. Khan nuclear supply network, however, have prompted a number 
of new initiatives, many of them building on existing efforts. President Bush articulated the 
following seven initiatives in his February 11, 2004 speech at the National Defense University:  
• Expand the work of the PSI beyond shipments and transfers to also include direct action 
against proliferation networks. To this end, expand cooperation with law enforcement 
agencies in addition to the ongoing cooperation between participants’ military and 
intelligence entities.  
• Secure UN Security Council passage of a resolution requiring all states to criminalize 
proliferation, enact strict export controls, and secure all sensitive materials within their 
borders.  
• Expand the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of 
Mass Destruction in terms of funds, donors, and recipients.  
• Agree within the Nuclear Suppliers Group to refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing 
equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, 
functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. Act to assure the supply of nuclear fuel 
to countries with truly peaceful nuclear energy programs.  
• Allow only states that have signed the NPT’s Additional Protocol to import equipment for 
their civilian nuclear programs. The U.S. Senate should ratify the Additional Protocol.  
• Create a special committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board that 
will focus intensively on safeguards and verification.  
• Allow only governments in good standing with the IAEA, i.e., governments not under 
investigation for Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty violations, to serve on the IAEA 
Board.[18]  
The international response has varied by the initiative, but some important progress has been 
achieved. In April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1540, thereby criminalizing 
WMD proliferation to non-state actors and mandating that all UN members establish effective 
domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of WMD and related materials. In the preceding 
month, the U.S. Senate ratified the Additional Protocol. Within a month of the President’s speech, 
PSI core members endorsed the President’s PSI initiatives. Progress is ongoing toward 
increasing cooperation among participating nations’ law enforcement agencies, and 
strengthening mutual understanding of their relevant domestic law enforcement authorities and 
capabilities. The Administration has completed work on an Executive Order to combat WMD 
financing—building on measures used against narcotrafficker and terrorist finances—and should 
issue this order in the near future.  
The picture is more mixed on cooperative threat reduction assistance programs. Although 
progress recently was announced in U.S.-Russia negotiations toward overcoming them, liability 
issues have obstructed some cooperative threat reduction work in Russia. The Administration can, 
and does, emphasize how much progress has been made in cooperative threat reduction 
assistance programs—including as a result of the G-8 countries’ $20-billion funding commitment 
in 2002 to these programs and the subsequent expansion in the number of donors for that effort. 
Critics, however, often highlight the fact that the G-8 countries collectively are still several billion 
dollars shy of fulfilling their $20 billion commitment. The Administration also emphasizes how 
many nuclear materials sites it has helped to secure in the former Soviet Union, while critics note 
that the larger portion of nuclear materials remain in sites not yet secured.  
The Administration’s nuclear fuel cycle and IAEA initiatives generally are encountering more 
resistance. The President’s initiatives in these areas are similar to those advocated by IAEA 
Chairman Mohammed El Baradei. But El Baradei has advocated a universalist, treaty-based 
approach while the Bush Administration characteristically seeks to pursue these objectives 
through the smaller and more flexible Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).[19] Even in the NSG, 
however, many countries resist initiatives that they perceive would freeze in place a privileged 
group of nuclear fuel cycle “haves” and a larger group of “have nots.” Less stringent criteria 
proffered by other countries reportedly are getting a better hearing. It remains to be seen what will 
come of these efforts. 
Conclusions  
So, what does one take from this review of the policy landscape? Overall, it is fair to conclude 
that the conditions for addressing the security challenges posed by WMD proliferation networks 
are favorable. As evidenced by such significant achievements as the establishment and ongoing 
expansion of the Proliferation Security Initiative and the UN Security Council’s adoption of 
Resolution 1540, there is a broad international consensus on the need to act against such 
proliferation sources. The Administration’s emphasis on action-oriented, multi-disciplined 
approaches built on expanding coalitions of the willing appears to be an appropriate response to 
an urgent and dynamic threat. Lacking, at least for the foreseeable future, a credible military 
threat to back efforts to negotiate the rollback of established WMD programs, greater reliance will 
have to be placed upon such measures to stem further proliferation to and from states and non-
state actors, as well as on deterring, preventing, and protecting against WMD use.  
The big question, of course, is whether the approaches being pursued by the United States and 
like-minded nations will be sufficient to achieve these ends. Continued progress on the law 
enforcement side of PSI is essential to dealing with the challenges of contemporary modern 
networks. Enlisting the direct support for PSI and related efforts from major nations still outside 
the initiative—like China, South Korea, and India—would be helpful. More will need to be done to 
secure adoption and implementation of measures like those supported by the Administration and 
the IAEA Director to make the nuclear fuel cycle less amenable to diversion for weapons 
purposes. Many nations will need assistance in order to comply with the requirements of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 in establishing effective domestic laws, controls, and law 
enforcement capabilities to counter WMD proliferation networks.  
Integrating various nations’ capabilities to combat WMD proliferation will be an even more 
challenging process; indeed, it remains a significant challenge within our own country. For 
example, in the area of intelligence, one of the challenges is to lessen the rift that exists between 
the state-focused efforts of the counterproliferation community and the more international efforts 
of the counterterrorist community. Then, nations could better discover, track, and act against 
proliferation between and among state and non-state actors. The WMD Intelligence Commission 
has offered recommendations in this area, and there are efforts underway within the National 
Security Council, and elsewhere, to address the challenge.  
I believe that the Bush administration also needs to give serious consideration to fashioning a 
declaratory policy that makes clear to states like North Korea the consequences they could 
expect should they transfer WMD capabilities to other actors, particularly to terrorists. 
Consideration also should be given to the measures that could be taken to dissuade allies or 
friendly nations—like South Korea, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt—from responding to likely 
North Korean or emerging Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons by acquiring such weapons of 
their own. For partners like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, this may need to include extending to them 
the protection of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.  
Finally, the United States must continue efforts to enhance its ability to detect and defend against 
WMD use, including the establishment of the new Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, since even 
our best efforts at dissuasion and deterrence may not succeed often enough.  
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